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OPENING OF THE TERM.
The opening exercises of the school, for
the 1900 and 1901 terms, were held in the
large lecture room, on October 3, at 3 P. m.
The members of the Faculty who were
present were :-Dr. Geo. Edward Reed,
Pres. of the Board of Incorporators; Dr.
William Trickett, Dean of the School;
Prof. Frederick C. Woodward, Prof. S. B.
Sadler, Major Jas E. Pilcher, U. S. A.;
Prof. Geo. Edward Mills, Hon. Jas. M.
Weakley.
The condition of the school is indeed
encouraging. The fifty new students who
matriculated for the year were beyond the
expectations of the Faculty. The 8enior
class numbers twice as many as the last
year's class,and is the largest in the history
of the school. This will certainly be gratifying news to the friends of the school.
Dr. Reed, President of the Board of
Incorporators, made the opening address,
in which he exhorted the student body in
general to retain a clean record and an unstained character while in the school and in

after life. He also referred to the amount of
time that was squandered by the loitering
of students at the several cigar stores of
the town and exhorted them to economise
time. In conclusion he extended a hearty
welcome in the name of the whole college.
Dr. Trickett then addressed the students
and gave a few regulations and rules of
the institution, announced the schedule
and assigned readings in the text-books.
Major Pilcher was then introduced and
after indulging in a few pleasantries, exhorted the student of law as well as the
practitioner to enter the field of politics;
stating that they were the men to whom
the country looks for its legislation, and
that the lawyer was the one who was prepared for that work.
The remaining members of the Law
Faculty assigned readings in the text-books
for the first class meetings in their respective courses.
As a whole, the opening exercises were
very enjoyable, and the speeches were
freely sprinkled with wit, which elicited
the applause of the student body.
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The exercises- were then closed by Dr.
Reed, giving a few words of encouragement
to the new students.

SCHOOL NOTES.
Many improvements have been made
in and about the building during the past
summer. The interior has been papered
and painted throughout. The recitation
rooms and the library have engaged the
special attention of the decorator. The
rooms have certainly been improved
greatly by the use of paper and paint, and
have been made more inviting than heretofore.
The library has been augmented by the
addition of the Ohio Reports and the third
set of Pennsylvania Reports, which, indeed, is a very valuable accession. Heretofore there had been only one set of
the inPennsylvania Reports, but
crease in the number of students during
the past few years, and the inconvenience
experienced by the students, have caused
the Faculty to procure the two extra sets,
to expedite research in those Reports.
It has been requested that the attention
of the student body be called to the use of
the books in the library. Should you take
a book from the shelves, after consulting
it you would confer a great favor to the
one who may have cause to consult the
same volume, by replacing it upon the
shelf, instead of laying it on the table.
By so doing you save the time of others
when they desire the same book, for they
can take it from the shelf immediately instead of being compelled to consume from
ten to twenty minutes' search, and the
use of strong adjectives during the search,
over the plies on the tables.
We suggest that the students should
read the advertisements in THE FORUM,
and patronize the business men of the city
who have been kind enough to give us
their ads., and in that way assist in sustaining the same. They are all reliable
and progressive men, and as they have
been kind enough to extend their patronage to the Law School in the shape of advertising in THE FoRum, it is but just that

inreturn the men of the school should extend a reciprocal courtesy toward these
gentlemen. It is to be hoped that the
men will assist those who assist THE
FORUm.
DELTA CHI FRATERNITY.
The following resolutions on the death of
Christian E. Lauer were passed by the
Delta Chi Fraternity:
WHEREAS, Christian Ellis Lauer, a
member of the Delta Chi Fraternity, has,
through the wisdom of God, been summoned from this earth.
Be it Resolved, That by his sad and untimely death we suffer the loss of one
whose nobility of character made him a
faithful friend and a loyal and earnest
fraternity brother, and whose industry,
modesty and integrity won the admiration of all of his fellow-students. His
memory will ever be cherished, and the
influence of his example will long be felt
among us.
Be it further Resolved, That copies of
these resolutions be sent to the several
Chapters of the Fraternity ; that they be
placed upon the minutes of Dickinson
Chapter; and printed in THE FORUM.
BY THE COMMTTEE.

THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
It is encouraging to note the great
interest manifested by the members of the
society in all its departments thus early
in the term.
The greatest harmony prevails and the
indications point toward the most successful year in the society's history. The first
meeting of the year was held on Oct. 4,
the main purpose being for the appointment of a committee to draw up resolutions
relative to the death of our deceased member, Christian E. Lauer. In the absence
of any set program, extemporaneous
speeches were called for and responded to
by both old members and visitors.
At the meeting of Oct. 12, the proposition
"Resolved, Thatastrike is the best method
available for the working men to secure
adjustment of labor troubles," was ably
debated, the judges deciding in favor of
the negative.
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A general debate followed on "The Issues
and Candidates of 1900," which aroused
intense excitement.
For the next three meetings of the society
the novel and interesting plan prepared
by the executive committee has excited
great interest among the membership.
The carrying on, in all its details, of the
regular work of a legislative body is proving of great benefit to all. The program,
as prepared, gives every member of the
society an equal chance to participate and
enables all to learn something about practical legislation. Committes are appointed
by the speaker of the House, bills introduced, debates held, and parliamentary
procedure is rigidly enforced.
Tire entire plan of holding sessions of a
House of Representatives has proved of
value to the -members and been the undoubted means of increasing the interest
in the society.
The society has made many valuable
acquisitions in its membership this year.
The following is a list of new men admitted
up to this time :-Phillips, Walsh, Cooper,
Devor, Cannon, Kline, Rogers, Core, Donohue, Helriegel, Lonergen, McKeehan,
McIntire, Kaufman, Drumheller, Shomo,
Lauer, Shuman, Crary, Mays.
Resolutions of Respect and Condolence.
The Allison Literary Society of the
Dickinson School of Law, desiring to express our appreciation of the character,
attainments and moral worth of our late
fellow member, Christian E. Lauer, resolve:
1. That we deplore the untimely death
of our late associate, whose many sterling
qualities of heart alnd mind won our respect and admiration while he was one of
our number, and whose memory we will
always gratefully cherish.
2. That we recognized in the student life
of Mr. Lauer the promise of a career of
honorable achievement and usefulness; of
eminence in the profession he was striving
to enter; and of an after-life bright with
the confidence and high regard of all who
might have the good fortune to know
him.
8. That in the death of Mr. Lauer, the
Allison Literary Society has lost one of its
brightest members, whose ability, Indus-

try and perseverance stimulated us to increased effort and nobler purpose and gave
character and prestige to our association.
4. That we tender to the bereaved family
of Mr. Lauer our sincere sympathy and
invoke for them the support of that Divine
Power, whose mercies are boundless and
whose love is a fortress and strong defence
for all who trust in Him.
5. That these resolutions be spread at
length on the minutes of the Society and
that a copy thereof be presented to the
family of our late associate and that they
be furnished for publication in THE FoRUMr.
THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The Dickinson Society has begun its
year's work under auspicious circumstances. That kind of zeal which manifests itself in work has not been found
wanting. The Junior members have already proved themselves a valuable accession.
The first meeting, held within a few
days after school opened, was, nevertheless, one of much interest. A debate by
Messrs. Hess, Davis, Trude and Osborne,
involving a discussion of "Expansion,"
an oration by Mr. Henderson, and a recitation by Air. W. T. Stauffer, formed the
chief literary features of the program.
Violin music, rendered by Mr. Stauffer,
formed a pleasing feature.
The second meeting was devoted to politics. The problems of government, which
are at present well recognized under the
nomenclature of "Trusts" and "Expansion," were discussed with considerable
accuracy and much interest. Mr. F. H.
Rhodes and Mr. John D. Brooks presented
the opposing theories with respect to the
extension of Uncle Sam's control over
foreign territory. Mr. Claycomb spoke at
some length on the "Trust" evil. The
questions were then open for general discussion, and several enthusiasts arose to
support their respective parties and principles with much fervor and intense argument.
The paramount aim of this society is to
give to its members a training in the practice of public speaking, and a successful
year's work along this line may reasonably
be expected.
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The following is the arrangement of lectures for this t6rm:
FRIDAY.

MONDAY.

TUESDAY.

WEDNESDAY.

THURSDA ).

Real Prop., 8.20
Crim. Law, 1.30
Blackstone, 2.30

Real Prop., 8.20
Crim. Law, 1.30

Contracts, 8.20
Torts, 11.00
Crim. Law, 1.30

Contracts, 10 30
Real Prop., 11.30
Torts, 2.30

Torts, 10.30

Mxnr)LR
CLASS.

Sales, 8.20
Evidence, 10.30
Blackstone, 2.30

Sales, 8.20
Evidence, 10.30
Practice, 2.30

Real Prop., 8.20
Sales, 9.30

Real Prop., 8.20
Equity, 2.30

Real Prop.,
Equity, 2.30

SENIOR
CLASS.

Cons. Law, 9.30
Quasi-Con.,11.15
Med. Juris., 2.30

Cons. Law, 9.30
Quasi-Con., 11.15

Wills, 9.30
Practice, 2.30

Wills, 9.30
Partnership, 1.30

Wills, 9.30
Partnership,1.30

OR

JUNIOS

CLASS.

ALUMNI NOTES.
John G. Miller, '00, has been admitted
to the Centre county Bar and also the
York county Bar during the past summer.
He has opened an office in the city of
York.

8.20

Harry C. Hubler, '99, has been admitted
during the past summer to the Northumberland county Bar.
J. Banks Ralston, '00, was admitted
quite recently to practice in the several
courts of Cumberland county.

Geo. W. Aubrey, '00, was recently admitted without examination to practice in
the several courts of Lehigh county.

Aaron Light, who has been a member
of the class of '01, enlisted in the U. S.
Marines quite recently.

W. Ernest Shaffer, of this place, was
admitted to practice law in the several
courts of this county, on Tuesday. He is
a giaduate of the Dickinson School of
Law, and will be associated in the conduct
of his business with an eminent legal
counsellor in the person of Henry T.
M r.
Harvey, Esq., of Lock Haven.
Shaffer will shortly open an office in
Rellovo.-The IRenovo Record, Sept. 28,
1900.

Leon C. Prince, '99, has been elected to
the librarianship of the college, and is also
assisting his father, Prof. MorrisW. Prince,
S. T. D., who holds the chair of Political
Science and History in the same institution.

H. Stanley Winlack, '00, passed a creditable examination before the Bar Committee of Bradford county for admission
to said Bar.
Michael J. Ryan, '00, is employed in the
office of John Dolphin, a prominent attorney in Mahanoy City.
Miles H. Murr, "00, has opened an office
in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
J. Austin Sullivan, '98, was admitted to
the Blair county Bar during the past
summer. The Examining Board commended him on his excellent examination.
W. Brooke Yeager, '00, was admitted
quite recently to the Luzerne county Bar.

Robert P. Stewart, '00, has entered the
office of a prominent politician in Deadwood, South Dakota.
A. Newton Wallace, '00, has located at
Cripple Creek, Colorado.
Eugene D. Siegrist, '99, was admitted to
practice in the several courts of Lebanon
county.
The following familiar faces were seen
in town during the past few weeks: Jas.
B. O'Keefe, 'CO; Miss SaraM. Marvel, '00;
Lawrence M. Sebring, '00; Dalbys Fickes,
'97; Wilson S. Rothermel, '00; Charles A.
Shambaugh, '98; Horatio W. Russell,
'00; Harry M. Collins, '00, and G. Arthur
Bolte, '00.
The Middle class has effected the following organization: President, William H.
Trude; vice-president, Robert K. MacConnell; recording secretary, William S.
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Detrich; treasurer, John N. Minnich.
The class also drew up the following:
Resolutions of condolence adopted by
the Middle class of the Dickinson School
of Law, of Carlisle, Pa., October 12, A. D.
1900, on account of the death of their
esteemed classmate, the late lamented
Christian E. Lauer, of Blandon, Berks
county, Pa.:
WHEREAS, It hath pleased the Almighty
God, the Great Ruler of the Universe, in
His all-wise and unerring judgment, to
cause to be removed from amongst us our
highly esteemed classmate, Christian E.
Lauer
AND WHEREAS, The gentlemanly conduct, studious, quiet and unassuming
manner of our late classmate, his earnest
devotion to his duties and to his associates
had endeared him to and caused him to
be beloved by us all, so that his sad and
untimely death has cast over us a deep
gloom; therefore, be it
Resolved, That we, the members of the
Middle class of the Dickinson School of
Law, take this method of expressing our
great grief occasioned by the sad and terrible death of our beloved classmate. That,
whilewe bow in humble submission to
the will of the Supreme Deity, whose
handiwork we all are, knowing that "He
doeth all things well," we trust that our
great loss may be the infinite gain of our
beloved comrade, who has departed from
us, gone on that journey from whence no
traveler ever returns. And be it further
Resolved, That we extend to the bereaved family of our late classmate our
sincere and heartfelt sympathy, sorrow
and regret, coupled with such consolation
as our intimate knowledge of his exemplary life, our high regard for his Christian character and our intense admiration
for his many manly qualities enables us
to fittingly express.
Resolved, That these resolutions be
spread at large on the class records, that
they be printed in THE FORUM, and that
copies thereof be forwarded to each of his
two surviving brothers.
On Tuesday morning, October 9th, a
mass meeting of the school was held in
behalf of athletics. Prof. F. C. Woodward
made a few brief remarks, followed by

Sam Boyle, the coach of the foot ball team,
and G. H. Bonner, manager. The proposition made by Mr. Bonner is as follows:
That each man be taxed $4.00 each year,
and paid as part of the tuition of the
school, and in return be presented with a
ticket to all the games played on the
athletic field, both base ball and foot ball.
He also urged the necessity of money for
the use of -athletics. After considerable
discussion on the part of the students, it
was decided that a committee be appointed
to see the college board on athletics, and
make arrangements for better representation on that committee. The students, as
a rule, patronize the games on the home
grounds, and probably would be willing
to support the proposition offered above,
provided the other grievances are amicably adjusted.
Prominent in this year's "'Varsity"
foot ball team are Core, McGuffie, Phillips
and Cannon, all of the Law School, and
all of whom are brilliant players.
Dickinson may be said to have the best
foot ball material she has ever had for
many years. The line men are very heavy
and quick and play with a great deal of
snap. Although Sam Boyle, the coach,
has been here but a few weeks he has
brought the men out in excellent shape.
The following is a schedule of counsel
in the Moot Court cases which have been
given out up to time of going to press:
PLAINTIFF.

Case No. 1. Clark,
Boyer.
"

"

"

"

"
"

"

DEFENDANT.

Deal,
Davis.
2. Frank,
Graul,
Drumbeller.
Detrich.
3. Alexander,
Basehore,
Adamson.
Barr.
4. Henderson,
Harpel,
Elmes.
Edwards.
5. Hess,
Halcolm,
Kostenbauder. MlacConuell.
6. Johnston,
Kennedy,
McIntyre.
Minnich.
7. Kern,
Kline,
Moon.
Nicholls.
8. Mitchell,
Shipman,
Osborne.
Points.
9. Piper,
Lightner,
Rhodes, J.
Rhodes, F.
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Valentine,
Case No.10. Stauffer,
Thorne.
Sterrett.
Brooks,
11. Turner,
Lonergen.
Brock.
Stauffer, J.
Alexander,
"12. Trude,
Clark.
Graul.
Shipman, J.
Frank,
"
"13. Taylor,
Basehore.
Henderson.
Hess,
14. Harpel,
Johnston.
Holcomb.
15. Kennedy,
Kern,
Piper.
Mitchell.
Valentine, J.
Adamson,
" 16. Dayis,
Kostenbauder.
Elmes.
Shipman,
17. Valentine,
MacConnell.
Drumheller.
Stauffer,
18. Lightner,
Edwards.
Detrich.
Barr,
19. Taylor,
Boyer.
Minnich.

MOOT COURT.
STEVENS vs. BLACK.
Bights of a vendee under articles of agreement to sell real estate, upon condition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Black agreed to buy from Stevens a
farm, on being told by Stevens that it was
a healthy farm, and that there was coal
under it in considerable quantities.
Stevens, who was not personally acquainted with the farm, had been so informed.
The farm was, however, very unhealthy,
and there was no coal under it. Black informed Stevens that he would btiy only
because of the facts communicated to him.
Subsequently, learning that the facts were
otherwise, Black refused to accept the
conveyance. The price to be paid was
$4000. Assumpsit.
MINNICH

and

KOSTENBAuDER

for

plaintiff.
There was no fraud in the transaction
and the defendant cannot rescind.-MeFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55; McCandless v. Young, 96 Pa. 289; Highv. Berret,
148 Pa. 261.

and NICHOLS for defendant.
The purchase was made upon certain
conditions which were not fulfilled and
the purchaser is entitled to rescind.-Hexter v. Bast, 125 Pa. 72; Bannerman v.
White, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 860; Holmes' Appeal, 77 Pa. 53.
POINTS

OPINION OF THE COURT.

Black informed Stevens that he would
buy the farm offered him by the latter for
$4000, only because, as he was informed by
Stevens, it was healthy, and was underlaid with coal in considerable quantities.
It matters little whether we term the representations of Stevens conditions, or
warranties. He understood that Black
was engaging to pay him $4000. for his
farm only on the condition that it had the
properties attributed to it.
It in fact did not have these properties.
It follows, we think, that even in an
action for damages for Black's refusal to
perform the contract, the defense made by
him would be successful. He was bound,
neither to pay the price, and accept the
conveyance nor, refusing the conveyance,
to pay any damages to Stevens.
But, this is an action, not for damages,
but for the price. Although it is assumpsit, the defendant can make the same defense that would have been available, had
the plaintiff resorted to a bill in equity.
That the untruth of Stevens' representations whether deliberate and intentional,
or not, would have defeated a bill, is not
doubtful. Holmes' Appeal, 77 Pa. 50;
Friend v. Lamb, 152 Pa. 529. And similar
equitable defences are available in an
action at law; Fisher v. Worrall, 5W. &S.
478.
It is not important to determine
whether the qualities of the land, insisted
on by Black, were sufficiently important
to justify a practical man in refusing to
buy land which did not possess them. He
chose to buy Stevens' land, because of,
and only because of its hypothetical possession of them. He made Stevens aware
that he was buying on this hypothesis.
If Stevens did not wish to make the
finality of the bargain dependent on the
farm's possession of these qualities, he
should have declined further to negotiate.
But, in no view of the case, can it be said
that the salubrity of the locality of a man's
residence is a matter of inferior import-
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ance. When Black bought the farm, he
bought it with a view to residence upon
it. Its unhealthfulness would have dterred him, altogether, if known to him,
from entering into any negotiation for it.
The result we have reached does not
depend on the honesty or dishonesty of
Stevens in making the representations.
He may have believed them true. The
important matter for Black was, not
Stevens' faith, but the actuality of the
properties in which heprofessedto believe.
Stevens may have supposed the farm
healthful. But it was in fact "very unhealthy." Black's family, had it undertaken to reside on it, would have found
Stevens' opinion a poor talisman against
its malaria and miasmata. Of. Blight v.
Samson, 137 Pa. 368.
Therefore, gentlemen of the jury, if you
find that Black's purchase was made on
the stipulations with regard to healthfulness described by the witnesses, and that
the farm is in fact "very unhealthy," your
verdict should be for the defendant.

HEIST and CONRY for Amos Hooper.

"Heirs" is used as a word of limitation
and the husband could dispose of the
policy after his wife's death, she leaving
no representatives entitled.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The position of this case has materially
changed by an admission of the counsel
for the plaintiff, that the assignment to
Amos Hooper by John Williamson was
void and of no effect and that Hooper was
not entitled to any part of the proceeds
from the policy. As admissions of counsels
are conclusive and binding upon the client,
the court need not decide as to the validity
of the assignment, and the part that
Hooper would have taken in the distribution of proceeds from the policy. So,
as the case now stands the persons who
are claimants for the proceeds from the
policy are the wife's (Lucinda's) administrators and John Williamson's administrators.
Now had Lucinda Williamson an absolute title in the policy on the life of her
husband? The courts have held that she
will
be presumed to have an absolute title
WILLIAMSON'S ESTATE.
until the contrary is shown, Anderson's
Superior rights of benefieiar7's estate in Estate, 85 Pa. 203, and the words, her
life insurance.
heirs, executors and administrators, are
further evidence of the kind of title the
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Williamson obtained a policy for wife would take in the policy which
$10,000 upon his life made payable to his would be an absolute one and not subject
wife Lucinda, her heirs, executors and ad- to any conditions, 83 Pa. 337, Deginther's
ministrators. Lucinda died before him Appeal. The question now is, who is to
receive the money of the policy?
leaving three children. After her death
Lucinda having an absolute interest in
he assigned the policy to secure $2000,
money borrowed by him at the time of the the policy on the life of her husband and
she dying before her husband, and his
assignment to Amos Hooper. Without
repaying the money he died four months assignment to Hooper by admission of
after the assignment. The insurance com- counsel being void and of no effect, would
pany paid the $10,000 over to John Wil- the interest pass to her administrators or
liamson's administrator. Claimants are to his administrators.
Mr. Justice Reed, speaking of policies of
his wife's administrator, his administrator
life
insurance, said in Elliot's Appeal, 50
and Hooper.
Pa. 75, that these policies were securities
FRANTz and TALBOT for estate of for money, valuable choses in action which
Lucinda Williamson.
may be sold at public or private sale, and
Husband's administrator is not entitled are included in the general words personal
to the insurance money.-8 W. N. C. 209;
property, and would pass under that head
13 W. N. C. 535.
Insured could not assign policy without by deed or will. Now if they would pass
consent of beneficiary.-Waltz v.Scott, 5 by deed or will they would pass under the
C. C. 208.
intestate law. Anderson's Appeal, 85 Pa.
Policy for benefit of married woman to
enure to her estate free from the claims of 203.
The legal title of personal property deher husband's creditors. Act of May 1,
1876. 1 P. & L. 2383.
volves upon the administrator as of the
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date of the death of the owner, for the
purpose of collection and of distribution
among the parties entitled by virtue of the
intestate law. The case as it now stands
has therefore been decided in Mutual Aid
Society v. Miller, 107 Pa. 162, and Andersons's Appeal, 85 Pa. 203. It seems clear
from established precedent that the money
from the policy would descend to her administrators and under the intestate law
be distributed share and share alike between the children of said Lucinda and
the husband's estate.

L. L. FRA-K.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The case below presents a question of
law which, so far as we now recall, has
not yet been decided in this state. Consideration of it was declined by the learned judges of the court below, for the reason
that counsel made an admission as to what
the law was. We are not prepared to concede that, the facts appearing, the right of
clients thereunder, may be sacrificed by
the inadvertent or ignorant concessions of
counsel. Facts may be taken as granted
by attorneys, but it is not for the courts to
evade the duty of applying the law to
these facts merely because the attorneys,
without investigation, or with incomplete
and inconclusive investigation, tell them
that the law is so and so.
The policy was obtained by John Williamson upon his own life, and was made
payable to "his wife Lucinda, her heirs,
executors and assigns." After her death,
Williamson assigned the policy to Hooper,
as security for $2000, money lent by the
latter to him. Williamson has died without repaying the loan. The company has
paid the money to the administrator of
John Williamson. The questions are, has
he a right to retain it, as against the administrator of Lucinda Williamson, or as
against Hooper the assignee.
That the administrator of Lucinda is
entitled to it, as against the husband's administrator is entirely clear. The cases
cited by the learned court below explicitly
affirm or presuppose this right. Society v.
Miller, 107 Pa. 162; Deginther's Appeal,
83 Pa. 337. The Act of April 15th, 1868, 1
P. & L. 2383, declares that "all policies of
life insurance or annuities upon the life of
any person which may hereafter mature,

and which have been or shall be taken out
for the benefit of * * the wire or children
* * shall be vested in such wife or children * * free and clear from all claims of
the creditors of such persop." The same
policy is expressed in the act of May 1st,
1876 supra. The cases cited and others
show that the death of the wife, for whose
benefit the policy is procured, before the
husband, does not affect her estate in it,
and that it passes to her executor or administrator, becoming payable to him, on
the happening of the death of the husband.
Has then the husband the right to assign the policy after the decease of his
wife? It would hardly be suspected that
he had such a right, had all the payments
upon it been made before her death. It
does not appear in this case, whether he
paid any premiums after her death or not.
We will assume that he did. He was
under no contract to pay these premiums.
He might have refrained, and had he refrained, the policy, perhaps would have
been voidable, though this does notappear
in the case. Does then the fact that the
policy will lapse, unless premiums are
paid, and that the lapse is prevented solely
by payments of premiums voluntarily paid
by the husband, after his wife's death,
authorize him, on paying such premiums
to appropriate the policy to himself, by
assigning it for a consideration ?
The act of May 1st, 1876, 1 P. & L. 2383,
enacts that 'A policy of insurance, issued
by any company incorporated under this
act, on the life of any person, expressed to
be for the benefit of any married woman,
whether procured by herself, her husband
or any other person, shall enure to her
separate use and benefit, and that of her
children, independently of her husband
or his creditors, or the person effecting the
same or his creditors. If the premium is
paid by any person with intent to defraud
his creditors, an amount equal to the
premium so paid, with interest thereon,
shall enure to their benefit." The policy
is to enure to the wife's separate use and
benefit, and that of her children, "independently of her husband, or his creditors." It is not his, nor theirs. Atmost,
premiums paid to procure the policy or to
perpetuate it, with interest, shall enure to
the benefit of the creditors, but this is only
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when they have been paid with intent to
defraud. It does not appear that any
premiums have been paid by Williamson,
with intent to defraud his creditors. And
it is clear that one who becomes a creditor,
knowing that the policy which he accepts
as collateral security, is payable to the
wife, cannot be defrauded by any payments of premiums which may have been
already made, or which may be made
subsequently.
"We apprehend the general rule to be,"
says Bliss, Life Ins., section 318 "that a
policy and the money to become due under
it belong, the moment it is issued, to the
person or persons named in it as the beneficiary or beneficiaries, and that there is
no power in the person procuring the insurance, by any act of his, by deed or by
will, to transfer to any other person the
interest of the person named. An irrevocable trust is created. The legal representatives of the insurance have no claim
upon the money, and cannot maintain an
action therefor, if it is expressed to be for
the benefit of some one else." Bacon,
Benefit Societies, p. 444; Biddle, Ins. 278,
282; Pingrey v. National Life Ins. Co. 144
Mass. 381 ; Chopin v. Fallows, 36 Conn.
132; Ferndon v. Carefield, 104 N. Y. 143.
The cases holding the opposite are not
convincing.
No reason therefore appears for denying
to the administrator of Lucinda Williamson the insurance money, and the appeal
from the decree of the court below is dismissed.
JOHNSON vs. JAMES.
Basement by prescription.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Johnson and James owned farms adjoining, that of the former lying on a
highway (A), and that of the other on
another (B). A lane ran across both
farms, connecting the two highways,
Johnson using the part on James' farm in
order to reach the highway (B), and
James' part on Johnson's in order to reach
the highway (A). The land had been in
this condition for thirty years,when James
put a fence across it at the boundary between the farms, and so prevented Johnson's further use of it.

This action is brought for damages.
Plaintiff offered to show (1) that predecessors of both parties using the land
orally agreed to lay out the lane for the
use of both. (2). Also, that Jacob Todd,
a former owner of James' land, had stated
to witness, the then owner of Johnson's
land had a right of passage across hisland.
James bought the land from Todd, but had
no knowledge of the alleged declaration of
Todd. It was shown that during the thirty
yearsJohnson, and those who preceded him
in the ownership, had used the lane on
James' land whenever they desired, without asking leave and without challenge.
Evidence (1 and 2) was excluded. The
court instructed the jury that there was
no sufficient.evidence of grant or of right
from user. Motion for a new trial.
RHODES and DETRIC: for plaintiff.

An admission of a right of way by a previous owner of a servient estate is competent evidence against a subsequent
owner. Bennett v. Biddle, 150 Pa. 420.
Whether or not an easement had been
established should have been left to the
jury. Susquehanna Coal Co. v.
61 Pa. 328; Gebman v. Erdman, 105 Pa.
371.
CLIPPINGER and KATZ for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The plaintiff's motion for a new trial is
based upon three grounds; first, that the
evidence of an oral agreement between
predecessors of the parties to lay out the
lane for the use of both, should not have
been excluded ;,second, that the declaration of Jacob Todd, a former owner of
James' land, to the effect that the then
owner of Johnson's land had a right of
passage across his land, should not have
been excluded; third, that the court erred
in giving to the jury binding instructions
in favor of the defendant. We shall consider these three points in the order named.
I. The nature of the alleged oral agreement between predecessors of the parties
does not clearly appear. If the agreement
had been offered by the defendant as evidence that the use of the lane was originally permissive,and not adverse, it would
have bsen ,admissible. But the plaintiff
seems to have offered it as evidence of an
easement, and since it is well settled that
an easement cannot be established by
parol evidence, the ofter was properly re-
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jected. Huff v. McCauley, 53 Pa. 210;
Geakle v. Jacob, 9 Casey 376.
IL The declaration of Todd, though
little more than an expression of opinion,
was at least slight evidence of the nature
of plaintiff's uses, and should have been
admitted. Bennett v. Biddle, 150 Pa. 420.
III. The court was unquestionably in
error in giving binding instructions for
the defendant. When, as in this case, one
uses a road over the lands of another for
a period of twenty-one years without asking leave, and without objection' a grant
is presumed. Garrett v. Jackson, 20 Pa.
331. That presumption may be rebutted
by showing the use to have been subservient rather than adverse to the'right of the
owner. In this case it appears that the
road or lane connecting the two highways
has been a mutual convenience to the
owners of the two farms. That fact may
be regarded as persuasive in some degree
to the view that. the use by each has been
merely permissive, and notadverse. But,
surely, it does not place the matter beyond
the realm of doubt, and consequently the
question should have been submitted to
the jury. In Bennett v. Biddle, 140 Pa.
396, the facts were similar to these before
us, although the evidence that the user of
the plaintiff was permissive, and not adverse, was somewhat stronger, since there
the persons who laid out and originally
used the lane connecting the two highways were brothers. Said the court in
that case: "What the fact was as to the
beginning and continuance of travel between these owners was for thejury. They
must determine whether the user has been
a friendly exchange of advantages, or
whether each has entered and exercised a
right of passage adversely to the other.
In the latter case only would lapse of time
give title."
.Motionfor new trialgranted.
JOHN WARNER vs. AARON HOPKINS.
.Ejectment.
STATEMENT

OF THE CASE.

Hopkins, on July 7, 1894, by articles,
sold two houses in Mechanicsburg to Warner for $2,000 each, payable one year after
the date of the contract, and Warner was

put in possession. The money was never
paid. In 1896, on May llth, Hopkins resolved to repossess himself of the premises.
One of the houses was vacant. He unlocked the front door and entered, and
placed a tenant in possession. The other
was occupied by Warner himself. He
entered the house with Warner's permission, but, when in, informed Warner tbat
he must leave, and, with a servant, set
out the furniture on to the street, Warner
making no resistance, but tendering the
money due. Warner brings this ejectment
for the two houses.
Ro'HERMEL and WALLACE for the
plaintiff.
1. When a vendee, fairly in possession
of and under articles of purchase, is ousted
by stealth, trick or fraud on the part of
the vendor, the vendee is entitled to recover in an action of ejectment without
making a tender of the unpaid purchase
money. D'Arras v. Keyser, 26 Pa. 249.
2. The defendant cannot be said to have
gained peaceable possession. Actof March
31, 1860 ; Com. v. Conway, 1 Brewst. 509;
Com. v. Johnson, 3 C. C. .641; D'Arras v.
Keyser, 26 Pa. 249.
SLOAN and LAVENS for the defendant.
I. Right of entry for breach of condition
i u a deed may be enforced if claimed within a reasonable time. Coal and Navigation Co. v. Early, 162 Pa. 338.
2. When vendor's possession is lawful,
vendee cannot maintain action of ejectnient without making a tender of the unpaid purchase money in court. Bell v.
Clark, 111 Pa. 92; Vincent v. Huff, 4 S. &
R. 298; Brindle v. McIlvaine, 7 S. & R.
345.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The propbsition is thoroughly established by authority, that a vendee once
fairly in possession of land under articles
of purchase, but ousted by force or fraud
by the vendor, is entitled to recover in an
action of ejectment, without making a
tender of the unpaid purchase money.
D'Arras v. Keyser, 26 Pa. 249. But it is
equally clear that when the vendee fails
to pay the purchase price within the time
fixed by the articles, and the vendor
thereupon peaceably retakes possession of
the premises, ejectment will not lie, unless
tender is first made of the unpaid purchase
money. Bell v. Clark, 111 Pa. 92. In
that case the court said that the rule might
be stated thus: "'When the possession of
the vendor is lawful, his vendee cannot
maintain ejectment against him without
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proof of a previous tender of the purchase
money, and he must also maintain that
tender by producing that money in court."
The reason for the rule is that under such
circumstances the action of ejectment is in
the nature of a bill for specific performance
of the contract to sell (Rennyson v. Rozell,
106 Pa. 407), and it is familiar law that
specific performance of such a contract
will not be enforced unless tender is first
made by the vendee. Vincent v. Huff, 4
S. & R. 298; Brindle v. McIlvaine, 7 S. &
R. 345.
In the case at bar, the vendee did not
make tender in court, and it does not appear that he made it at any previous time.
It is contended, however, that the possession of the defendant is not lawful ; that
his entry was effected by force and fraud.
The evidence does not support such a conclusion. One of the houses sold he found
vacant, and opening the door he placed a
tenant in possession. These are the precise circumstances of the entry in the case
of Bell v. Clark, supra,where the vendor's
possession was declared to be lawful. The
other house was occupied by the vendee
himself. Defendant knocked at the door,
and being admitted, demanded possession.
Plaintiff offered not a single word of protest, and permitted defendant to remove
his goods. Such conduct, we think, may
fairly be regarded 6s an acquiescence in
defendant's right to retake possession.
Certainly, defendant's act cannot be construed to be an entry by force or fraud.
It does not appear that he had the slightest
intention of using force, or even of resorting to legal process, in case plaintiff refused to peaceably surrender possession to
him.
Judgmentfor defendant.
REBECCA BROWN vs. JNO. CLARK.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Clark, living with his invalid
Wm.
wife on a large farm owned by Clark, contracted with his daughter, Mrs. Brown,
that she come and live with him and take
care of Mrs. Clark, who was not expected
to live many days. At the end of one
year Win. Clark would give her the deed
of the farm, he to live with her thereafter.
The daughter came, bringing with her her

husband and two sons, who at no time
contributed anything towards the family
expenses. Clark's pension and the income
of the farm was the only means of support.
Four months after moving to her father's
she demanded the deed and was refused;
she then left the farm and brings an action
for services rendered. Can she recover?
BARR and Jos. RHODES for plaintiff.
When a special contract has not been
fully performed, but the plaintiff has, in
good faith, done what he believed to be in
compliance with the contract, and thus
rendered a benefit to the defendant, he
may recover the value of his services.
Hayward v. Leonard, 7 Pick, 181; Denham v. Bryant, 141 Mass. 27; Blood v.
Wilson, 139 Mass. 110.
DRUMIIELLER and LEE for defendant.
The contract is entire and the plaintiff,
having shown only partial performance,
can recover nothing. 151 Pa. 534; 8 W.
& S. 367; 66 Pa. 351; 3 Harris, 351; 1 W.
& S. 301; 2 Pa. 454; 10 Barr, 231.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

A contract between Win. Clark and his
daughter, Mrs. Brown, was entered into.
Of her, it required that she go to the farm
on which Clark resided, and with her
husband and two sons take up her abode
there, and take care of Mrs. Clark, an
invalid, whose death in a few days was
expected, and remain on the farm. She
was also to permit her father tb live with
her thereafter, and doubtless to take such
care of him as the filial instincts of a
daughter, with whom her father resides,
prompts her to render. On the other
hand, the contract required Clark to convey the farm to Mrs. Brown at the end of
one year after the commencement of her
residence on it.
The daughter moved with her family
on the farm, but, instead of remaining on
it until the end of a year and beyond, left
when four months afterwards, on her demanding a deed, her father refused to give
it to her. Meantime, she had contributed
nothing to the support of the family,
Clark's pension and income from the farm
furnishing all that was consumed by it.
Refused the deed, the daughter with her
family left the farm and brought this
action for compensation for alleged services
rendered.
There was, it thus appears, an express
contract. The daughter was to remain on
the farm for a year and more, and her re-
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ward was to be the conveyance at the end
of the year.
She remained but four
months, and then demanded the deed.
She had no right to it. The refusal of
her father to deliver it was no wrong to
her, and no justification for her leaving
the farm. She contracted to earn the
deed in a certain way. She has chosen
not to earn it. She did not contract to
earn any other form of compensation.
We have discovered nothing that could
make the father liable to her for services
rendered by. her under a contract that
only when they were continued was she
to be rewarded, and then only with the
land. It would be perilous to make a
contract if one of the parties, inexcusably
ceasing to perform in the midst of performance, could compel the other to accept the incomplete service, and pay for
it against his intention and expectation.
On the case stated judgment must be for
the defendant.
JOHN McKFAN vs. SAMUEL OIJIPHANT & GEORGE TITLOW.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Titlow and Belmont were a firm carrying on under the name of Titlow & Co.
the building business, and Titlow, using
the firm name ordered lumber, $800 worth,
from McKean. Oliphant had on several
occasions aided Titlow & Co. with money
and by becoming surety in purchases. On
two or three occasions, he had united with
Titlow in contracts and notes, in which
he and Titlow described themselves as
Titlow & Co. McKean knew that Titlow
was of the firm to which he sold lumber,
but he did not know who the other member was. The note he received for the
lumber was written by Titlow, and signed
Titlow & Co. Being unpaid, McKean
sues on it Oliphant & Titlow, trading as
Titlow & Co.
DAVIS and DETRIcH for the plaintiff.
(1) The record should be so amended as to
substitute the name of Belmont for that of
Oliphant, which can be done by the court
on application.-2 P. & L. Dig. 3632;
Donckmiller v. Young, 27 Pa. 97; Haskinson v. Eliot, 62 Pa; 393; Fidler v. Hershey,
90 Pa. 363.
(2) A firm is liable for whatever is done
by any of the partners acting for the firm.

-Lindley on Partnership, No. 160; Bank
v. Gore & Grafton, 15 Mass. 80; Evans .v.
Watts 192 Pa. 112; Huffman Form Co. v.
Rush, 173 Pa. 264; Rice v. Johnson, 171
Pa. 89.
BOYER and DEBLE for defendant.
(1) Oliphant cannot be made a defendant in this action, since there is n) evidence that McKean relied upon the credit
of Oliphant as partner in effecting the
sale.-Dunham v. Rogers, 1 Pa. 255; Erwin
v. Budwell, 72 Pa. 244; Hart v. Kelley, 83
Pa. 286.
(2) Oliphant cannot be madeliable under
the principle of estoppel since there is no
proof that he publicly held himself out as
partner, or made specific declarations to
that effect to the plaintiff.-41 Pa. 30; 3
Watts 101; 63 Pa. 97; 3 Phila. 298.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Oliphant was not a member of the firm
of Titlow & Co., but did he hold himself out
as a member of the said firm in such manner as to justify the belief on the part of
McKean that such was the case, and by
reason of this was credit given to the firm
for the lumber sold by tile plaintiff? This
is the question for determination.
From the mere loan of money to a firm
or becoming its surety, the inference would
not be justified that the lender or surety
was a member thereof. The mere fact
that on two or three occasions Oliphant
had united with Titlow in contracts and
notes in which he and the latter designated
themselves as Titlow & Co. would not in
the absence of proof that these transactions were brought to the knowledge of
McKean be held to have influenced him
in giving the credit to Titlow & Co. It
does not appear that the plaintiff ever discussed with Oliphant what business relations, if any, existed between him and
Titlow. It is not alleged that Oliphant
made any declaration or did any act in the
presence of McKean which was likely to
lead him to conclude that he, Oliphant,
was a member of the firm of Titlow & Co.,
nor does it appear that he gave the credit
by reason of such a belief.
While it is true that a man who is not a
member of a firm, may become answerable
by holding himself out as a partner, yet
to enforce liability it must be shown that
he held himself out as a partner under
circumstances of publicity which justified
the belief that theplaintiff knew and acted
on his declarations, or by proof of specific
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DAUGIIERTY and LEE for the plaintiff
and appellaht.
I. A statute of limitations not allowing
reasonable time after its passage for the
commencement of suits on existing causes
of action is unconstitutional. Jackson vs.
Lampshire, 4 Wheaton 207; Carl vs. Haggar. 8 Mass. 430.
2. Acts of Assembly destroying vested
rights are unconstitutional. Van Horn vs.
Dorrance, 2 Dallas 310; Norman vs. Hust,
5W. & S. 171; Battam vs. John, 5 Barr 149.
FRANK and OSBORNE for appellee.
1. Retrospective law divesting vested
rights, unless ex post facto or impairing
obligation of contracts, is not unconstitutional. Lane vs. Nelson, 79 Pa. 407.
2. An enactment reducing the time
prescribed by the Statute of Limitations
in force when right accrued is not unconstitutional. Hawkins vs. Barney, 5 Peters
451; Jackson vs. Lampshire, 3 Peters 280;
Sohn vs. Patterson, 84 U. S. 596.
OINION OF THE COURT.
On February 1, 1895, when the note in
this case became due, the statute of limitations allowed six years within which to
bring suit. A little over two years later
a statute was passed limiting the time to
three years "after the cause of action has
accrued," and further providing that "this
should be effective in all cases after Dec.
1, 1897."
This action to collect the sum due by
the note is brought in June, 1898. Thus,
if the new statute of limitations is meant
to apply and can yroperly apply to this
case, the debt is barred.
The first question: Does the three year
statute of limitations apply to this case?
When the legislature directed that it
"should be effective in all cases after Dec.
1, 1897," did it mean the statute to apply
WM. MARTIN vs. MILES FISSEL.
to all cases in which a right of action
should afterwards accrue, or was it meant
Action of assumpsit.
to apply to all cases in which an action
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
should thereafter be brought? We are of
opinion that it meant the latter.
On February 1, 1895, a note for $1,000,
There is a general presumption against
due by defendant to plaintiff, became paythe retrospective operation of statutes, and
able. The statute provided action should
laws should never be considered as applybe brought within six years. On July 1,
ing to cases which arose previously to
1897, a statute was passed providing that
their passage, unless the legislature have.
such action should be brought within three
clearly declared such to be their intention.
years after the cause of action has accrued,
and it was further provided that this Taylor v. Mitchell, 57 Pa. 209; Eakin v.
Raub, 12 S. & R. 330; Price v. Mott, 52 Pa.
should be effective in all caes after De315. But the force of this presumption is
cember, 1897. In June, 1898, this action
much lessened in the case of remedial
was brought. Fissel defends on ground
statutes, and where such statutes do not
that the action is barred by the statute.

declarations made to the plaintiff and
credit given in pursuance thereof by the
latter.-Johnson v. Warden, 3 Watts 101;
Cirk v. Hartman & Co., 63 Pa. 97; Craig
v. Warner, 3 Phila. 298.
"The evidence from which you would
have to find that he so held himself and
acted as a partner must be his acts in connection with the circumstances which
were known to the plaintiff when they
gave credit, and not only must his acts
have been such as to justify reasonable
belief that he was a partner, but to hold
him on that account, you must further
find as a matter of fact that they gave him
credit as such, because if they did not, his
holding himself out as a partner would do
them no harm."
This instruction to the jury was held to
be a correct statement of the law in Burgan v. Cahoon, 1 Pennypacker 320.
Justice Paxton delivering the opinion
in the case of Denihorn v. Hook, 112 Pa.
243 declared, after citing with approval
the determination in Burgan v. Cahoon,
supra, "this proposition of law is accurate as stated and supported by abundant authority."
"Before a party can charge an alleged
firm, or a person who has been held out to
the world as a partner, the party seeking
to charge them must have had knowledge
of such fact and given credit upon the
the faith of it." Ibid.
The plaintiff is not entitled to recover
against Oliphant and the action being
against joint defendants, no recovery can
be had in this action against either.
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destroy all remedy they will be considered
as applying to causes of actidn subsisting
at the date of their passage. Endlich on
Int. of Statutes, section 287, Kille v. Iron
Works, 134 Pa. 22-5; Bates v. Cullum, 177
Pa. 633; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall 596;
Byers v. Penna. R. R. Co., 18 C. C. R. 187.
The provision in the act suspending its
operation for several months is indicative
of an intention that it should apply to
antecedent matters. Queen v. Leeds R'y
Co., 83 E. C. L. 343.
If then the new statute of limitations is
retrospective in its nature, does it, when
applied to the present case, offend that
constitutional provision which forbids
legislation impairing the obligation of contracts? Igit does not, then it is valid; for
retrospective laws, divesting vested rights,
unless expostfacto or impairing the obligation of contracts, do not fall within constitutional prohibitions. Lane v. Nelson,
79 Pa. 407; Grim v. Weissenburg School
Dist., 57 Pa. 433.
In discussing this question it is to be
noted that there is a distinction drawn
between statutes which affect the obligation of a contract and those which affect
or modify the remedy, merely. The legislature may enlarge or curtail the remedy
to -any extent, provided there still remains
to the creditor an available remedy. The
legislature may substitute one remedy for
another, although the second remedy be
not as convenient as the first. See Evans
v. Montgomery, 4 W. & S. 220. "An act
may reduce' the period of limitation for
bringing suit if it leaves a reasonabie period
for suits for breaches of existing contracts." Kenyon v. Stewart, 44 Pa. 179;
Karn v. Browne, 64 Pa. 55; Wheeler v.
Jackson, 137 U. S. 245; Terry v. Anderson,
95 U. S. 628; Metz v. Hipps, 96 Pa. 15;
Smith v. Packard, 12 Wis. 412; Vance v.
Vance, 108 U. S. .514.
Did the plaintiff in this case have a
reasonable time within which to bring
In
suit under the three-year statute?
answering this we must first decide when
he had notice of the new statute. In the
case of Price v. Hopkins, 13 Mich. 318,
Justice Cooly lays down the rule that until
the day when an act is to take effect arrives,
the law has no force, even as notice to the
persons to be affected by it. In stating
this principle the court lays particular

stress upon the fact that the constitution
of Michigan contained a provision specifying that a particular time shall elapse
between the passage of an act and its going
into effect, unless the legislature shall
otherwise direct. A contrary rule is found
in the case of Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick.
430. The latter case teaches that the public
has notice of a statute from the date of its
passage, and not from the date when it is
limited to go into effect. This case is
favorably commented upon in Karn v.
Browne, 64 Pa. 58. See also Queen v.
Leeds RWy Co., 83 E. C. L. 343. The
position taken by these cases seems unassailable.
On July 1, 1897, then, the plaintiff had
notice of the fact that the time for bringing
suit had been shortened. Was this reasonable notice? The plaintiff had seven
months, from July 1, 1897, to February 1,
1898, within which to commence suit before
the statute could operate as a bar to his
claim. There are numerous cases in which
a nearly identical time has been held
reasonable. Wheelerv. Jackson, 137 U.S.
245; Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick. 430; Smith
v. Packard, 12 Wis. 412; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628.
The legislature has, in the act under
discussion, specified the date when the act
is to go into effect and has set that period
at five month from the time of its passage.
We cannot conceive why the legislature
should postpone the operation of the
statute, unless for the very purpose of
affording all parties to be affected a time
within which to bring suit before being
barred by its provisions. If, then, the legislaturehassetatime, is it for us to dispute
its propriety? If the time set were so unreasonablyshort as to practically destroy all
remedy, and thus offend common sense or
good conscience, we might have power to
interfere; but, in general, the time set by
the legislature must. be followed. Smith
v. Morrison, 22 Pick. 430; Karn v. Browne,
64 Pa. 58; Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet.
280; Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U. S. 256.
Applying the foregoing principles to the
present case, we must decide that the Act
of July 1, 1897, operates as a bar to the
present action, and we therefore render
judgment in favor of the defendant.
W. S. CLARKE, J.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

The judges of the court below being
equally divided in opinion as to the right
of the plaintiff to recover, thejudgment of
the court was entered in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff thereupon
appeals to this court.
Both the judges seem to concur that the
statute of July 1st, 1897, reducing the time
within which action must be brought, is
constitutional, but they differ as to the
intention of the legislature to make it
applicable to causes of action in existence
and mature, when it was enacted.
The Act contains two provisions: (1) that
all actions on promissory notes shall be
brought Within three years after they
become payable, and (2) that the act should
be effective in all cases, after December 1,
1897. But for the second of these provisions, it might be doubtful whether tie
act was intended to apply to cases already
in existence, but it is impossible to
avoid the inference that the object of
the second provision was to make the act
in all cases operative, after December 1,
1897, even though the cases had begun
before July 1, 1897. Cf. Gilbert v. Ackerman, 159 N. Y. 118. It follows that the
judgment must be affirmed, since the
action was begun after the note had become
more than tliree years old, and after December 1, 1897.
Judgment affirmed.
KANTNER vs. PRICE.
Act of .March 24, 1818. Act of June 20,
1883. Assignment for benefit of creditorH. .Ejectment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On Aug. 17, 1897, Win. Koller, residing
in Cumberland county, made an assignment for the benefit of creditors to Samuel
Hoover. The deed was recorded in the
county of Franklin, where Koller owned
a farm, on Aug. 20th, and in Cumberland
county on Sept. 17th. Koller having been
indebted to Kantner, was sued by the latter, who, on Jan. 11, 1898, obtained a judgment for $800 in Franklin county, and on
this judgment caused a sheriff's sale of
thg land in that county, becoming the
purchaser; meantime Hoover made a sale

of the land to Price under an order of the
court for the discharge of liens. This is
ejectment by Kantner to recover the possession.
ADAMASON and MOTCGUFFIE for plaintiff.
Sale of Hoover, the assignor, was void;
the deed was not recorded as provided by
Act of Iarch 24, 1878. The place of resideuce of the assignor determines validity
of assignment. Trickett on Assignments,
page 13; Reigart's Appeal, 4 Barr 477.
OSBORNE for defendant.
Where land is sold in another county at
sheriff's sale under judgment against the
assignor, subsequent to the assignment, a
purchaser with notice takes no title as
against assignee. Follweiler v. Lutz, 102
Pa. 583.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The Act of March 24, 1818, relating to
assignments for the benefit of creditors,
provides that "all assignments which shall
not be recorded in the office for recording
deeds in the county in which the assignor
resides within thirty days after the execution thereof, shall be void."
An Act, approved 20th June, 1883, provides for the computation of time, as follows: "That where by existing law or
rule of court, or by any law or rule of
court that may hereafter be enacted and
,iade, the performance or doing of any act
or duty, matter, payment or thing shall
be ordered and directed

.

*

*

and the period or duration for the performance or doing thereof shall be prescribed and fixed, such time in all cases
shall be so computed as to exclude the first
and include the last days of such prescribed or fixed period or duration of time."
The deed in the present case was recorded in Cumberland county, vhere the
assignor resided, on September 17th, that
is, on the thirty-first day after it was
executed. Under the provision of the Act
of Assembly above referred to, it is void.
This was not cured by a record of the same
in Franklin county at an earlier date, and
within thirty days.
"Recording in the county where the
land lies is no substitute for the recording
of the same in that in which the assignor
resides, as required by the Statute." Reigart's Appeal, 4 Pa. 479.
"Where not recorded, as required by the
Statute, it may be avoided by the creditors." Weber v. Samuel, 7 Pa. 499; Wallace v. Warnwright, 89 Pa. 263.
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In Folweiler v. Lutz, 102 Pa. 585, cited
and relied upon by the defendant, the deed
had been fully recorded in the county
where the assignor resided.
Thejudgment recovered by Kantuer was
therefore a valid lien on the farm of Koller,
and the sale of it on execution, and purchase thereof, vested in him a good title
to the same.
The order of the court to Hoover, and
sale by him to Price, were ineffectual to
vest the ownership of the land in the lattel'. The plaintiff is entitled to the land
described in the writ.

FRANK and LIRHT for plaintiff.

A purchaser at a sheriff's sale is not required to look further than the record. 6
W. & S. 280; 72 Pa. 484. Roop may compel payment of $1,300 by ejectment. Riel
v. Connor, 161 Pa. 289. Conditional verdicts are valid. Lauer v. Lee, 42 Pa. 165.
HARPEL and KEMP for defendant.
Caveat emplor applies to sheriff sales.
Roop took but the interest Keagy had.
Smith v. Painter, 5 S. & R. 225; Freeman v. Caldwell, 10 Watts 9; Weidler v.
Bank, 11 S. & R. 134.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The chief reason assigned for the granting of a new trial is that the instruction
to the jury was erroneous. The instrucJACOB ROOP VS. GEORGE MILLAR.
tion in substance was that if Roop, the
plaintiff and purchaser at the sheriff's
.jectrnent. Sheriff's Sale. Instruction
sale, had no notice of the contract between
of Court. Conditional Verdict.
Hope and Keagy, he was entitled. to a
verdict conditioned for the payment of
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
$1,300; if he had notice of the contract, he
was entitled to a verdict conditioned for
On a judgment against John Keagy, his
payment of $1,300, less $750. Or in other
land was sold by the sheriff to Jacob
Roop for $2,000. Roop, by articles, conwords, that, if Hoop had notice, Millar
tracted to sell the land to Win. MeComas
could set off the $750 paid on the contract
for$2,500. Subsequently, McComas trans- by Hope to Keagy, and if Roop had no
ferred his interest in the contract to his
notice this could not be set off and the
brother Jacob, who with what William
plaintiff was entitled to a verdict for the
had paid, paid $1,200 of the purchase full $1,300.
money. Prior to the recovery of the
As a general rule the doctrine of caveat
judgment against Keagy, he had con- emptor applies to judicial sales and the
tracted to sell the land for $1,250 to Jona- purchaser acquires whatever interest the
than Hope, who paid $750 of the price.
defendant in the judgment had, yet this
Believing Hope's title to be better than
rule has its limitations, and in the AmeriMcComas', Millar bought it for $800. He
can and English Encyclopedia of Law,
subsequently, however, bought MeComas'
22 Vol. p. 634, it is laid down that "the
title, paying $900 for it. Roop brings this purchaser at a sheriff's sale is protected
ejectment to compel Millar to pay the re- from claims acquired before judgment by
mainder of the purchase money. Roop
third persons from the execution degave evidence to show that when he
fendant, whereof he had not actual or
bought the premises he had no notice of constructive notice."
Hope's contract, actual or constructive.
The same doctrine is upheld in Newman
Millar's evidence tended to show that
v. Davis, 24 Fed. Rep. 609; also Goepp v.
Roop had such notice. Roop sought a
Gartiser, 35 Pa. 130.
verdict conditioned on the payment of the
The jury having found, as a matter of
residue of the contract price, $1,300.
fact, that Roop had no notice of the Hope
Millar insisted that all he was entitled to
contract, we can see no good reason for
was what remained unpaid on the Hope disturbing their finding. It was Millar's
contract, $500. The Court told the jury
duty to satisfy the jury that Roop had
that if Roop had no notice of the Hope
notice of the contract between Keagy and
title he was entitled to verdit conditioned
Hope. Mulliken v. Graham, 72 Pa. 490.
for payment of $1,300. If he had notice,
Not having done so, we cannot assist him
he was entitled to $1,300, less $750. Verby ordering a new trial.
dict for Hoop, with condition for $1,300.
Counsel for the defendant contended
Motion for new trial.
that the conditional verdict was invalid;
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the validity of these verdicts is sustained
in Lauer v. Lee, 42 Pa. 165.
The new trial is therefore refused.
W.

ALFRED VALENTINE, J.

JOHN BANDEL vs. CHAS. RANDAL,
OWNER, AND JAMES SANDEL, CONTRACTOR.

streets, is null and void upon its fitce.
French v. Kaign, 3 W. N. 0. 495; Geopp
v. Gartiser, 35 Pa. 130.
2. Where there is an interval, however
small, between two houses orsets of houses,
an apportioned claim cannot be sustained.
Fitzpatric v. Allen, 1 Phila. 372.
3. When material is furnished in exclusive reliance on the contractor or owner
himself no lien can be created. 135 Pa. 604;
24 Pa. 507.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Sci. fa. to enforce mechanics' lien.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Randal, owning a tract of land, contracted with Sandel to erect twenty-four
houses on it, twelve fronting north on A
street and twelve south on B street. He
intended to lay out a small street, fourteen
feet wide, at the rear of these two sets of
lots. After the cellars NWere dug of all the
twenty-four houses the fourteen-foot street
was staked off, and then the buildings
were commenced. Sandel contracted with
Bandel to furnish all the hardware for the
houses. This he did, his bill amounting
to $1,800. The contract called for a three
months' credit. Not receiving payment
within the three months, Bandel filed a
single lien against the twenty-four houses,
apportioning the bill among the two sets
of houses on the ratio of $1,000 and $800,
the houses on A street having the more
expensive hardware. Upon each house
on B street he apportioned $66.66%. Subsequently Randal sold eleven of the houses
on B street, and the liens thereon W'ere
paid out of the purchase money. This sci.
fa. is to enforce payment against the
twelfth house, still owned by Randal.
E. H. BROCK and SAMUEL E. BASEfor plaintiff.
1. Houses situated on a single lot, a
number of which fronting on one street
and a number on another street, are subject to an apportioned lien. 20 Pa. 443.
2. A contractor has the right to file an
apportioned lien against two or more buildings owned by the same person. Act
March 30, 1831; P. L. 242, 4.
3. One apportioned lien may. be filed
against buildings situated on the same ]ot.
Gordon v. Norton, 186 Pa. 180; Mill Co. v.
Greenawalt, I 1 Pa. Superior Ct. 161.
Jos. RHODES and H. P. KATz for defendants.
1. A mechanics' lien filed against distinct blocks of buildings, separated by
HORE

In this case, a single lien was filed
against twenty-four houses, the property
of the same owner, twelve of which faced
on A street and twelve on B street. These
two blocks of houses were separated by a
plot of ground fourteen feet wide, which
the owner had staked off with the intention that it should be a street. Tlheplaintiff apportioned his bill among the two
blocks of houses on the ratio of $1,000 and
$800, one block containing the more expensive houses. Upon each house on B street
he apportioned S66.66%. Eleven of the
houses on B street were sold, and the liens
paid out of the purchase money. Upon
failure to receive payment for the twelfth
house, the plaintiff issued a sci.fa. to enforce payment.
Whether or not this was a valid lien,
depends upon the question, Were the two
blocks of houses separated by a street? In
other words, did the acts of the owner,
namely, the staking off of this strip of.
ground and the sale of eleven of these
houses, which, with, their lots, extended
to this fourteen-foot strip, coupled with his
intention that it should be a street, constitute a dedication of it as such?
In McCall v. Davis, 56 Pa. 431, it was
held, that where an owner of ground lays
it off into town lots, with streets and alleys
for their convenient use, and sells his lots
accordingly, it is a dedication of these
ways to the use of the purchasers.
In the Appeal of Ferguson and wife, 117
Pa. 426, Justice Paxson said: It is a well
settled principle of law, that where, upon
a sale of lots, reference is made to a map
or plan upon which they are laid down,
and which calls for certain streets and
alleys, this constitutes a dedication of these
ways to the use of the purchasers as public
ways.
It was ably argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the deeds for the
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sale of these houses may not have called
for the middle of this fourteen-foot plot as
the boundary. Be that as it may, the
court is of the opinion that, whether the
deeds called for the middle or the side of
this plot,.it makes no difference so far as
the dedication is concerned, for in 1 Hill
191, in the matter of opening Thirty-ninth
street, New York, it was held that an
owner dedicates his adjoining land as the
site of a street, whether he bounds the land
sold by the centre of the street or the side
thereof.
In Quicksall and Lee v. City of Phila.,
177 Pa. 301, it was held, that a sale of lots
according to a plan which showed them to
be on a street implies a grant to or covenant with the purchaser that the street
shall be forever open to the use of the public, and operates as a dedication of it to the
public use. The right passing to the purchaser is not the mere right that he may
use the street, but that all persons may
use it.
Again, in Higgins v. Borough of Sharon,
5 Superior Ct. 92, the court held, that
where an owner makes a plot, on which
spaces are left indicating the dedication of
streets not previously projected by the
public authorities, and sells lots with reference to the plot, he cannot recall his dedication. In harmony with the above decisions are In re Pearl street, 111 Pa. 565 ;
Griffin's Appeal, 109 Pa. 150, and Trickett's
work on Penna. Road Law, 432-605.
Since we have decided that these two
blocks of houses are separated by a street,
it is indisputable, we think, that there
cannot be an apportionment of this claim,
and therefore the lien against the twelfth
house is invalid. In Schultz v. Asay et
al.. 2 Pennypacker 411, Judge Thayer said:.
"There is no case which holds that either
joint or separate apportioned claims can
be filed against houses not adjoining in
any sense, but which were separated by
streets, and therefore situated in different
blocks, or which decides that any right of
fixing and charging the amount of a claim
by the process of apportionment, exists in
cases of houses so situated."
In 3 W. N. C. 495, it was distinctly decided that a material man cannot maintain a claim which rests upon an apportionment made between houses in different
blocks, because such apportionment is

within neither the reason nor letter of the
Acts of Assembly, nor any previous decisions.
WM. H. TAYLOR, J.
So far as the right to apportion claims
for materials among several houses depends upon statutory authority, it is clear
that the Acts of Assembly contemplated
only "houses and buildings adjoining each
other" as proper subjects of such apportionment, and the reason assigned for permitting the apportionment in the Act of
1831, is, that as to houses so situated "it
sometimes happens that it is impossible
for the person who has provided material
to specify in hiselaim the particular house
or building for which the several items of
his demand were provided." Both the
Acts of 1836 and 1850, where they speak
of the apportionment, clearly refer to the
apportionment previously authorized;
that is, to the apportionment provided for
in the Act of 1831, and not to any new or
different kinds of apportionment.
The case of Pennock v. Hoover, 5 Rawle
291, where the claims were made under
the Act of 1806, and its supplement of
1808, was the case of a claim filed against
contiguous houses, and it was held that
claims against such houses ,might be filed
against all the houses jointly, or they
might be apportioned and separate claims
filed against each. In Davis v. Farr, 1
Harris 167, and Harper v. Keely, 5 Harris
234, it was held that either joint or separate
apportioned claims may be filed against
adjoining houses. But there is no case,
so far as we can find, which holds that
either joint or separate apportioned claims
can be filed against houses not adjoining
in any sense, but which are separated by
streets, and therefore situated in different
blocks, or which decides that any right of
fixing and charging the amount of a claim
by the process of apportionment exists in
the cases of houses so situated. The
reason assigned by the Act and by the
cases for permitting a charge by apportionment, does not exist in such a state of
things, for as was said in Chambers v.
Varnall, 3 Harris 265, it is as easy to distinguish between separate blocks as it is
between separate houses in different
streets.
In Goepp v. Gartiser, 35 Pa. 130, and in
the subsequent case of French v. Kaign,
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3 W. N. C. 495, it was distinctly decided
that a material 'man cannot maintain a
claim which rests upon an apportionment
made between houses in different blocks,
because such an apportionment is neither
within the reason nor the letter of the
Acts of Assembly, nor within any previous
decision.
If this is an accurate statement of existing law, it is obvious that, if the so-called
street is legally a public street, the claim
as filed is invalid, inasmuch as it is filed
for distinct and separate sets or blocks of
houses. We are of the opinion, however,
that the street is not apublicstreet; reaching this conclusion by a strict adherence
to the facts as given to us.
In Kline's Appeal, 93 Pa. 422, cited by
the learned counsel for the plaintiff, a
tract of land was divided by its owner into
ten building lots fronting on a street. On
these lots ten houses were built, two
houses adjoining each other, making five
blocks of two houses. Between two of
these blocks an additional space of 60 feet
was left intended for a street. Lienswere
filed against the whole row, which were
apportioned among the ten houses. It
was objected that the liens could not beso
apportioned because of the separation of
the houses by this 60 feet space. It was
held that the rights of the mechanic with
reference to apportionment were to be determined by the time when the work was
commenced, and as the space had not
then been dedicated as a public street, the
liens were properly apportioned.
In the case at bar, the street was staked
off but nothing was said as to whether it
was opened or not. In the case just cited
it was said, "At the time the tract or
piece of land was laid out the 60 feet were
intended for a street, but when the buildings were begun, and up to the "timewhen
they were finished and liens filed, no
street was laid out and opened, and none
has been to this day." See also Alkinson
v. Shoemaker, 151 Pa. 153. There .is another element, however, to be considered,
viz.: The selling of lots after the street was
staked off. There are numerous decisions
which hold that where a tract of land is
divided into lots and new streets laid out,
such streets become public if the different
lots sold are described as bounded by those
streets. Nothing is said in-the statement

of facts as to whether the lots were sold
with reference to a plot or map, or if they
were bounded by this street. They
may have been sold with no reference
whatever to the prospective street. We
think that if this fact can be regarded as
evidence at all, it tends more to support
the theory that the so-called street was
intended for a private-way or passage-way
for the use of the purchasers of the respective lots. In Trickett on Penna. Road
Law, page 603, we find the statement "To
constitute a dedication there must be an
intention on the part of the owner to confer on the public the right of way, and this
intention must be manifested by appropriate acts." Nothing is said as to whether
it was intended for the public; it was
never opened to or accepted b3i the public,
and in view of these facts we cannot regard
it as a public street.
There remains the question whether the
unequal apportionment between the two
sets of houses is valid. Upon principle it
is clearly so. The houses on A street contained the more expensive hardware and
should receive a larger apportionment on
that account than the houses on B street.
We are not compelled, however, to resort
alone to principle, but have good authority
to sustain this view. In Fitzpatrick v.
Allen, 20 P. F. S. 292, a lien was filed
against twenty houses; ten on C street,
and ten on M street; the claim was for
roofing, and amounted in the whole to
$751.57; the lien was apportioned, viz:
$49.41 on each of the C street houses, and
$25.75 on each of the M street houses. The
scifa was on the lien against one of the M
street houses, and it was enforced.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that
the lien is valid, and that the scifa should
be enforced.
H. STANLEY WINLACK, P. 3.
JOHN JfUDSON vs. HENRY SALOP.
Duress and undue influence.
STATIENT OF THE CASE.

Charles Salop, father of Henry Salop,
and grandfather of Judson (a son of Chas.
Salop's deceased daughter) owning a farm,
orally promised giatuitiously to convey it
to Henry. Judson learning of the promise, and dissatisfied because he would lose
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a share in the land if Charles Salop carried
out his purpose, expressed his discontent
to Henry and threateLed "to make such a
fuss around grandfather's ears" as would
cause him to change his iiihid. After
some importunity, he at last procured
from Henry Salop the following paper:
"I hereby agree that if my father conveys the farm on which he now lives to
me prior to his death, I will at once make
a deed for the third of it, bounded as follows, (here are given the boundaries) to
my neplhew John Judson, in fee simple."

[Seal]

HENRY SALOP.

The conveyance was made to Henry,
and immediately he notified his nephew
that he repudiated his agreement. The
one-third which he agreed to convey to
Judson was worth $2500. Assumpsit.
H. S. WINLACK and W. B. GERY
attorneys for plaintiff.
1. The rule supported by reason and by
weight of authority, is that the question
of duress per minas vel non, is one of fact
in the particular case, and is for the jury.
Griffith v. Sitgreaves, 90 Pa. 161; Feller v.
Green, 26 Mich. 7].
2. It is not impossible for parties to
enter intentionally into a binding gratuitous promises.-Aller v. Aller, 40 N. J. L.
446; Candor's Appeal, 27 Pa. 119.

E.

TAYLOR DAUGHERTY

and H.

M.

COLLINS attorneys for defendant.
1. A sale of a mere expectancy is void at
law but may be enforced in a Court of
Equity, when founded, upon a sufficient
consideration.-Baylor v. Com., 40 Pa. 37;
Power's Appeal, 63 Pa. 443.
2. Equity will -not grant its peculiar
remedy of specific performance, nor exercise any power over contracts, when the
promises are without consideration, even
though they were under seal.-Clark on
Contracts, page 366; Smith v. Wood, 12
Wis. 425.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This action in assumpsit is brought to
enforce the specific performance of a
con tract, under seal, given, by Henry
Salop
to
John Judson, by which
the former agreed to convey to the
latter, one-third of a certain farm
which Salop's father had orally promised
to convey to him. This agreement was
conditioned upon the fulfillment of the
father's promise and was educed by expressions of discontent, importunity and
threats on the part of Judson, (who was
the son of the elder Salop's deceased daugh-

ter,) "to make such a fuss around grandfather's ears" as would cause him to change
his mind. This conduct on the part of Judson was due to a fear that if his grandfather
carried out his purnose to convey the farm
to Henry Salop, he (Judson) would be
precluded from sharing iii Charles Salop's
estate. It may be well to here indicate
what position the courts have taken with
reference to the use of this form of action
for the enforcenientofspecific performance.
A considerable- number of cases bear us
out iii the statement that assumpsit is in
its nature an equitable action, and in accordance with this principle it has been
laid down that specific performance in the
action of assumpsit, covenant or debt (now
assumpsit under act of May 25, 1887,
P. L. 271) is enforced by a verdict for
the value of land or such other sum as
will compel the execution of the contract
of the vendor, to be released on the tender
and filing of a sufficient deed according to
the terms of the contract. Findlay v.
Kein, 62 Pa. 112; Haftzinger v. Roth, 93
Pa. 448. The defense in this action, set
upby Henry Salop, involves these points:
that the defendant was induced to make
the promise contained in the agreement
by means of duress and undue influence;
that there was not a sufficient consideration for the promise, and that it is contrary to the policy of the law to enforce

contracts for the conveyance of estates in
expectancy.
We have been unable to discover from
the facts submitted any of the qualities
which go to make up duress or undue influence. This point is therefore dismissed.
We recognize that it is a general principle of the law, that a seal when affixed
to a written agreement imports a consideration, by virtue of its form, and that it is
not impossible for parties to enter into
binding gratuitous promises. We bear in
mind, too, the principle that equity will
not grant its peculiar remedy of specific
performance * * * where the promises are

without consideration, even though they
are under seal. Baylor v. Com., 40 Pa. 37.
So in this action of assumpsit, equitable in
its nature, as we have seen, it is for us to
look into the transaction and the circumcumbtances attendant upon the giving of
the instrument in question and to determine whether or not ulterior to the mere
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making of the specialty, there was such
consideration as would invoke the aid of
equity in securing the enforcement of the
contract. Upon close examination of the
facts, we conclude that a sufficient consideration was present in the contemplation of Henry Salop, in the fact of the
likelihood that his father, Charles Salop,
would convey his farm to him, and the
additional fact that John Judson would
forbear "to make such a fuss around
grandfather's ears" as might cause him
to change his mind.
If Charles Salop
should have, or could have, been induced
to die intestate, under the law, Judson, as
the representative of his deceased mother,
the daughter of Charles Salop, would have
shared equally with his uncle, Henry
Salop, in the distribution of his grandfather's estate. So it was, evidently, in
the mind of Henry Salop that should Judson approach his grandfather in this matter, the old man might be induced to
change his mind and make some provision
for his grandson in the disposition of his
estate. It was therefore entirely proper
for Salop and Judson to enter into any
compromise which might be acceptable to
them. There can, then, be no further
question as to the sufficiency or validity
of the consideration necessary to support
the contract.
As to the matter of the agreement to
convey an estate in expectancy, it has
been laid down, that the sale of a mere expectancy is void at law but may be enforced in a court of equity when founded
upon a sufficient consideration. Baylor v.
Com., supra. Bispham's Equity, 164 &
cases cited. Having decided upon the
point of sufficiency of consideration, this
point is therefore disposed of.
Having determined that the contract in
question is a valid one, binding force will
be given it. The court therefore directs
the jury to render such a verdict as shall
compel the execution of the contract, the
money allowed plaintiff not to exceed the
value of the one-third of the premises,
with interest, Henry Salop, said defendant, to be released from the
payment of said amount, upon the
tender and filing of a sufficient deed, according to the terms of the contract.
By the Court.
A. F. JoHri, P. J.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The intestate law would have given to
John Judson and to Henry Salop undivided halves of the land in question. A
gratuitous conveyance by Charles Salop
to the latter would have given him all,
and left nothing for the former. The dissatisfaction of Judson was neither surprising or unreasonable, and he had a
right to expostulate with his grandfather, and, if he could, to cause in the
grandfather the abandonment of a purpose so disastrous to him. In order to
avoid the possible, perhaps probable, result of this expostulation, Henry Salop
promised to convey one-third of the land,
one-sixth less than the intestate law would.
have given him, to John Judson. No
difficulty in enforcing this promise is presented by the statute of fraud, for it is in
writing. The consideration is not mentioned in the writing, it is true, but that
is unnecessary.
Why, then, should the contract not be
enforced? It is far from gratuitous. In
reliance upon it, Judson refrained from
exercising a right, the exercise of which
might have won for him one-half of the
land. This was a detriment to him, and
a corresponding benefit to Henry Salop.
It is not necessary that we regard the
assumpsit as a substitute for a bill for specific performance. The contract has been
broken, and at law an action accrues to
one party to a contract, on its breach by
the other, for damages, whether the subject thereof be realty or personalty. Had
a money price been payable by Judson,
the damages would have been the difference between that price, if not paid, and
the value of the land. The consideration
has, in fact, been given and cannot be returned by Henry Salop. The value of onethird of the land represents the damages
which Judson has suffered, on account of
Salop's refusal to comply with his contract. It is clear, we think, that Judson
is entitled to recover that value, or $2,500.
Judgment affirmed.

COM. vs. WML JONES.
Libel-Motion for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In the Twelfth Judicial district of Penn
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sylvania, Win. Roberts was nominated by
the Democratic party for the office of
President Judge. A newspaper, published
in Harrisburg, but circulating more widely
in Cumberland, Adams, Perry and Lancaster counties than in Dauphin, issued
after the nomination but before the election, contained the declaration that
Roberts had on one occasion committed
the theft of a deed and otherpapers. The
issue was, as usual, sent into all the counties named. The Commonwealth did not
show the untruth, nor did the defendant
show the truth, of the charge. But evidence was offered to show that the publication was made after due inquiry, and
with a view to prevent an unfit person
being chosen to the office. The court excluded the evidence as irrelevant. Motion
for a new trial.
C. S. DAvis and D. F. DEAL for Commonwealth.
1. To constitute libel, the statements
must be published maliciously. Barr v.
Moore, 87 Pa. 385; Pittoch v. O'Neill, 63
Pa. 258.
2. Certain publications are privileged if
the circumstances under which they are
made rebut the inference of malice.
McGraw v. Hamilton: 184 Pa. 108.
W. S. CLARK and R. F. BORYER for defendant.
1. It is the province of the court, and
not the jury, to determine whether the
matter is proper for public investigation
under the section. Com. v. Murphy, 8 Pa.
C. C. 399; Com. v. Singerly, 15 Phila. 368.
2. The matter in this case was proper
for public investigation. Com. v. McClure,
1 Pa. C. C. 207; Com. v. Rudy, 5 D. R. 270.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is provided by the seventh section of
Article I of the Constitution of our Commonwealth that "no conviction shall be
had in any prosecution for the publication
of papers relating to the official conduct of
offices or men in public capacity or to any
other matter, proper for public investigation or information where the fact that
such' publication was not maliciously or
negligently made shall be established to
the satisfaction of the jury."
Roberts was a candidate for Judge in the
district where the newspaper of the defendant was published. The voters had a
right to be fully acquainted with his character and attainments in order that they
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might be able to intelligently pass upon his
qualifications and fitness for the position
he sought. That a public journal is a proper
medium through which to communicate
with them will be conceded. If Roberts had
been guilty of the offence as charged, it will
not be denied that it will be a proper reason
for a refusal to support his candidacy. His
moral character was a most importafit consideration in determining whether he was
entitled to receive the suffrages he was seeking.
We think, therefore, that the publication was on a proper occasion, and unless
malicious or not based upon reasonable or
probable cause was a privileged one. While
we are of the opinion that the matter was
a proper one for public investigation or information, yet it was incumbent upon the
defendant, who had thereby charged Roberts with having committed an indictable
offence, to show to-the satisfaction of a jury
that the publication was maliciously or
negligently made. This he offered to do
but the evidence was rejected by the court.
Adjudications made in the following
cases since the adoption of the Constitution
of 1874 clearly established the law as to
privileged communications in Pennsylvania.
Commonwealth v. Singerly, 15
Phila. 398; Briggs v. Garret, 111 Pa. 404;
Conway v. Times, 139 Pa. 834; Com. v.
Place, 152 Pa. 314; McGaw v. Hamilton,
184 Pa. 108.
In the light of the decisions in these
cases,we are satisfied that it was error not
to receive the evidence offered by
the defendant to show the motive that
prompted him to make the publication
and that it was not made until after due
inquiry had been had as to the truth of
the charge embodied therein.
A new trial will therefore be granted.

HOPE HOLLIS vs. JAS. KAMES.
Assumpsit.
STATEMENT OF T11E CASE.
Adam Hoover devised his land to "my
son, John, for life, and at his death to his
children, if any he shall have." John,
after the testator's death, married, and, a
son was born to him, who lived four
months and died. Two years later a sec-
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ond son, Jacob, was born. John desired
to sell the farm, and, uniting with the
guardian of Jacob, petitioned the orphabs'
court for leave to sell it. Leave was
granted, and the land sold to Kames for
$5,000. This is assumpsit by Hollis, the
guardian, whom the court made trustee
to effect the sale. Kames denies the jurisdiction of court. The sale was made under the Price act of April 18, 1853.
WALLACE and MITCHELL for plaintiff.
STAUFFER and MEARKLE for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The only question in this case is, Will
Kames get by the sale a good title in fee
simple to the land bought by him? If he
will, he has no defense. If he will not, he
will not be compelled to pay the amount
bid by him. Westhafer v. Koons, 144 Pa.
26.
The sale was under the Act of April 18,
1853, 2 P. & L. 4046. Power is conferred
on the courts to order a sale by that act
only when certain conditions exist. In
the absence of such conditions a sale would
be void, for want of jurisdiction in the
court ordering it. We must ascertain
whether the court had jurisdiction. The
common pleas has the power to make the
sales provided for in the act, in all other
cases than those in which the "real estate
shall have been acquired by descent or
last will ;" and the orphans' court in cases
where the land has been so acquired.
The Hoover land has been acquired by
its present owners by devise and descent.
The orphans' court, if any, had the
authority to-order the sale.
Among the conditions on which a sale
may be ordered are mentioned "whenever
real estate shall be held for or owned by
minors," and "whenever a decedent's real
estate is subject to the lien of debts not of
record, whenever real estate shall be entailed, or contingent remainders or executory devises shall be limited therein."
Did these conditions exist in the case
before us ?
The Hoover land has been devised to
John Hoover for life, and the remainder
to children, and Jacob Hoover is one of
these children, and a minor. The first of
these conditions therefore exists. We
think that the orphans' court had the
power, for proper cause, to order a sale of

the interest of Jacob. Butwhat was that
interest? The devise was to "my son,
John, for life, and at his death to his children, if any he shallhave." John, at the
testator's death, was yetunmarried. Until the birth ofa child, the remainderwas
contingent. As soon as a child was born
the remainder vested in him. Keller v.
Lees, 185 Pa. 402. Four months later this
child died. His whole estate passed to
his father, who was of the blood of the
perquisitor, Adam Hoover. But, notwithstanding this inheritance of the child's
remainder by his father, that remainder
would open so as to admit to shares in it
subsequently born children. When Jacob
was born it was reduced to an undivided
half, and Jacob took the other undivided
half. On the ground of Jacob's minority,
only this undivided half in the remainder
could be sold by the orphans' court.
Neither the fee in the other undivided
half, nor the life estate of John Hoover,
could be disposed of by it.
John Hoover has, however, petitioned
the court, in conjunction with the guardian of Jacob, and offers a deed in which
he unites with the guardian. His interest
will, therefore, be acquired by the purchaser, Kames, and can furnish no reason
for Kames' refusal to accept the deqd.
But will Kames' title be a good one? As
the remainder, vested in the first-born son,
opened to admit Jacob to a share in it, on
his subsequent birth, so the remainder in
John, inherited from the first-born son,
and in Jacob, will again open to admit any
other child or children that may hereafter
be born. Has the sale to Kames cut off
these floating or contingent remainders in
the, as yet, unborn children? If it has,
Kames gets all he expected to get, a perfect title in fee simple, and has .no good
reason for refusing to pay the purchase
money. If it has not, his title would be
seriously defective. He may hereafter
lose a third, a half, three-fifths, two-thirds,
or even a larger fraction of the land. Such
a title he will not be compelled to pay for.
The contingent remainders in the children that may hereafter be born to John
Hoover have not been cut off. The fifth
section of the Act of April 18, 1853, 2 P. &
L. 4052 conditions the power of the sale to
bar contingent remainders by the proviso
"that the petition shall set forth an ex-
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planation of the title and of the purpose to
bar the entail, defeat the contingent remainder," etc. No such purpose is manifested in this petition on which the present
sale was ordered. The contingent remainders are therefore not barred. Westhafer
v. Koons, 144 Pa. 26 ; Smith v. Townsend,
32 Pa. 434.
But had the petition mentioned the
remainders and declared the purpose to
be to bar them, the decree thereon, it seems,
would not have been effectual to bar them.
In Keller v. Lees, 176 Pa. 402, it is maintained by Green J. that as the whole remainder vests in the children already
born, the interest which those subsequently to be born have, are not to be treated as
contingent remainders in the sense of that
expression in the act of April 18, 1853. No

sale under that act could be ordered for the
purpose of barring them. The policy of
the act, which was to make land alienable
despite contingent interests of various
sorts, is thus to a degree thwarted, and it
is discovered that it affords no remedy in
one important class of cases. The decisiofn
is recent and by the court of last resort.
We are constrained by it to the conclusion
that Kames, if he accepts the land, will
be exposed to the risk of having his estate
in it diminished by the later birth of children of John Hoover. For this reasdn her
will not be compelled to pay the purchase
money.
Your verdict, therefore, gentlemen of
the jury, should be for the defendant.

